Iain Sanderson's newest comments

Maggie,
A fire door, generally, is a door that has been subjected to and passed a specified British Standard or European test. The exceptions tend to be doors that have been assessed and upgraded by specialists to enable, for aesthetic and/or historic reasons, the original door to be used. Those doors subjected to test should be indentifiable as to the fire rating of the door and this is usually by a marker set into the door edge.
As Alan states, the intumescent strip requires to be in the location specified as a result of the test the door was subjected to. Additionally, the majority of fire doors require cold smoke seals as smoke will leak round the frame of the door long before the intumescent trip exapnds from exposure to heat.
Again I would reiterate what Alan says the the doors should be marked however, in my previous life as a fire service regulator, I would expect the sign to be visible and would not have accepted such a notice on the door edge.

BS 9999 was not drawn up by the fire authorities all be it they had, amongst others, representation on the BSI committee and sub committees.
Fire lifts are suitable for use in evacuation of disabled persons unstil such times as the fire and rescue service arrives. Indeed current thinking is that it may, following an appropriate fire risk assessment, be appropriate to use 'normal' lifts in evacuation.

Regarding Karen's comment on intumescent grilles, fire doors generally require to stop the passage of cold smoke as well as fire, hence the need for cold smoke seals on fire doors. An intumescent grille will not stop the passage of cold smoke.
I agree with Alan that the statements regarding an open final exit door fanning the fire are misleading at best. These are not fire doors and do not require to be fire resisting and self closing apart from the situations that Alan describes.

Both the landlord and the tennants require to carry out a fire risk assessment to determine the required fire fighting equipment needs, along with other fire saafety matters. Information in relation to fire safety in Scotland (it is different)can be found at www.firelawscotland.org/. The legislation is the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005. The legislation refers, in Sections 53 and 54, to 'employers' and 'a person has control to any extent of relevant premises' as the person(s) who would require to carry out the risk assessment.

The discussion involving refuges is missing the function of the the refuges and that of the Fire and Rescue Service. The function of the refuge is, and always has been, a temporary waiting space for those unable to escape in the event of fire unassisted. That assistance is to be provided by those resposible for the management of the premises. The fire and rescue services function is to rescue people. If people require rescuing the evacauation plan for the building has failed. Any escape strategy that relies on rescue is an incompetent strategy as it accepts 'failure' of that strategy. Where you are dealing with people who are known to be in the building (employees) who have a disability that prevents self evacuation, then there must be a personal emergency evacaution plan (PEEP). There should also be a generic system where members of the public have access.

I would also suggest that the fire officer who refuses to accept refuges is in need of retraining.

Any fire exit door can be used as an entrance door. Indeed it could be argued that the use of the door ensures that it will work when the emergency arises.

This discussion re-enforces my point of view that there has to be competent people involved in all parts of the process of providing a safe premises in respect of fire. The only way this can be verified by enforcers is that there is a suitable paper trail as the enforcers do not have competent people when, as stated in this case, the incompetent action involved the innnards of a fire alarm panel.

The one thing I hope comes out of this case is that people realise that, under the RRO, it is not only the occupier or landlord that can be taken as the responsible person. Although the term resposble person is not used in the Scottish legislation the responsibility of the likes of fire alarm installers etc. is clearly there.

On the subject of prosecutions, I find it rather strange that there have been few, if any, prosecutions under the Scottish equivalent of the RRO, the Fire (Scotland) Act. I doubt that this is because we are so musch better at legislative compliance in Scotland compared to England and Wales.

Martin, thanks for the information on BD2466

Martin,
People should be aware that lifts can only be used if there is an appropriate fire risk assessment carried out as to there suitability. Not all lifts are suitable. Some are designed as means of escape lifts. Whether they are designed for means of escape purposes or a "standard" lift, there has to be suitable and appropriate management to control and handle such use. It should also be borne in mind that some lifts are designed to provide firefighter access and to that extent must descend to the fire service access floor. Barry is quite correct in that firefighters' lifts have a separate supply but these are not always supplied by a generator system. IF that mangement is appropriate and a fire risk assessment has been carried out that indicates that it would be acceptable to use the lift, the local fire officer should be challenged.
The main thing is, before all start saying that all lifts can be used for emergency evacuation, carry out a fire risk assessment to ensure that all the structural and management systems will support such a use.

Alex,

No urban myth because the Fire Brigade rescued them.

Having a statement defining the relevant person in this way was as a result of persons seeting fire to premises (as I recall it was in Livingstone near Edinburgh) and not being able to escape and subsequently succesfully suing the owner.
Unfortunately to test the new legislation it would indeed require a court case.
There are numerous methods of ensuring the security of final exit doors without resorting to the use of keys both whether the premises are occupied or not.

Section 21.3 of the document Mark refers to states "In most situations fire-resisting doors should be fitted with smoke seals, as these restrict the passage of smoke into the escape route from the room where the fire is situated.". The detail regarding "well fitted and constructed solid doors" appears in the written clarification and is qualified by ataing "Subject to the absence of any high risk factors and the inclusion of all other relevant fire safety precautions recommended in the guidance this arrangement may be accepted."

I would suggest in the light of other research, it is unlikely that many 'standard' HMOs would be unlikely to have an absence of high risk factors.

The exceptions to the fitting of smoke seals is related to only having detection in the corridors. In my experience the rooms in the majority of HMOs would be classified as having a high enough risk factor that, following a suitable Fire Risk Assessment, detection would be provided in each room. THis is supported by the fact that the BRE research into the provision of sprinklers in premises highlighted that HMOs were on of the few types of premises where sprinklers should be provided - but that's another topic.

Both Part 3 the Fire (Scotland) Act and the Regulatory Reform Fire Safety Order would override the 1984 Act as the duty is to the 'relevant person' and this is defined as any person who is lawfully on the premises.

Any door that is required to stop the spread of smoke requires cold smoke seals. This would include all doors protecting an escape route. How long it takes for a person to respond to a fire alarm is dependant on numerous factors and the type of automatic alarm system is only one of them. The early warning is improves the chance of escape, but a more important factor is the response time of the individual being alerted.
I have certainly never heard of a situation where a lack of smoke seals has been compensated for by the provision of a higher than minimum required fire alarm. But all this is down to the considered judgement of the Fire Risk Assessor.

This has certainly been an interesting discussion and highlights a problem that is not new.
All sorts of people be it tradesmen, regulators or consultants seem to think that 25mm checks are how you deal with fire doors and intumescent and smoke seals are a new fangled idea. It goes back to the late 80's when it was realised that the fire door test used then, being carried out in an open furnace, did not reflect the pressure build up in a room fire. The result of the investigation proved that in a test furnace where there was a pressure build up all these previously accepted fire doors failed. In 1990 a new British Standard was issued, BS 8214:1990. This is where the specifications for the construction of Fire door assemblies with non-metallic leaves was first published. This has been superceded by BS 8214:2008 but the 1990 version is that still quoted in Building Regulations. I recall in the late 80's seeing a video comparison between a door fitted with 25mm checks and the same door fitted with various intumescent strips from different manufacturers and this hotch potch of intumescent strips ensured that the door performed far better than the one assemled "in the way we always did it".
As far as RRO or, in Scotland, Part 3 of the Fire Scotland Act being retrospective, this is only true within limitations. When the Fire Precautions Act was repealed, it was with the intention that Fire Safety should be dynamic and not trapped by the time the Fire Certificate was issued despite developments in technology or advances in understanding. However, whilst it is necessary to access against todays standards it is not necessary to absolutely comply with them. A judgement is required to acccess to what extent the particular premises fails to comply with todays standard and from that judgement decide whether the premises require alterations to make it fully comply, partially comply or not be altered at all. The decisions that is made has to be fully justifiable and doing this requires some level of training, dependant on the complexity of the issue being considered.

Dr Iain A Sanderson

Barry,
I'm not up to date with the situation in England and Wales on this particular point but in Scotland under Section 54 of the Fire (Scotland) Act, you only need to consider persons who are legally on the premises. I would be surprised if the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order does not deal with this in a similar manner.

John,
I agree that the simplest form of securing device is best. However, if there is an insistance that, when the premises are unoccupied and the occupier is unwilling/unable to spend the additional money for more expensive 'panic type' fastenings, given propoer controls, supported by a sutable and sufficient fire risk assessment, using a bolt may be acceptable.
The idea of the door being available 24/7 is only relelvant if the premises are in use 24/7. The duty in terms of fire safety is only to those who are legally on the premises. Certainly this is in PArt 3 of the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 to avoid, as has happened in the past, owners/occupiers being prosecuted by persons who have broken into premises and cannot leave after they have set fire to the premises.
I totally concur with Alan regarding the use of keys whether or not in glass boxes. The bottom line is that any door on an escape route has to be readily openable by one easy acction without resorting the use of a key WHEN THE PREMISES ARE LEGALLY OCCUPIED. Whether the action is easy or not can only be decided by careful consideration of the physical and/or mental abilities of those using the door as part of your fire risk assessment.

This would only be acceptable if there is a set down procedure to draw the bolts back and secure (padlock) them in the open position and this should be the first action of the first person entering the premises. This should be formally identified in teh Fire Risk Assessmnet.

Having worked for over 27 years in the fire service and now working in the higher education sector I perhaps 'get out' a little more than you assume and certainly the world is real. If this is common practice where you hail from, then it is obviously known about so who is doing something about it.

The point is that a statement without support and adequate consideration is unhelpful.
I am very well aware of the issues you describe but there are many ways to resolve these issues. Security and suitable means of escape are not incompatable - I have dealt with means of escape issues in a 'Secure Hospital'. It just costs more. The major issue is that local and national government, aided and abetted by those employed in such premises, seek the cheapest possible option without any consideration of the potential disastrous consequences.
Another point of clarity should be made here - a fire door is one that prevents fire and smoke entering a protected route out of a building or subdivides a corridor. These doors have a specified fire rating. The door giving access to outside is a fire exit and does not require any sort of fire rating.

Nigel - This sort of inane comment helps no one!!